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and consequently the principles upon which a trust may be executed cy pres
have no application.
The Ohio courts have sometimes by-passed the principles of dedication
and diversion an their zealous efforts to promote the public welfare, while
incidentally augmenting the municipalities' sagging revenues. Particularly
in the alientation cases, confusion has arisen where the courts have upheld
legislative short-cuts taken in lieu of the applicable proceedings for appropriation. Even in those instances where dedicated land may be appropriated, the appropriation must be for another public use. Consequently a subsequent alienation would only convey the fee of 'the municipality, but the use can never be eradicated, and remains solely with the
public. With the availability of such proceedings, short-cuts should be
avoided, and consequently those few "guideposts," now -obscured in a
labyrinth of overly liberal opinions, will indicate possible avenues of approach -to those courts and counsel now floundering in the "by-paths of
confusion."
JAMi~s F. O'DAY

The Form and Reform of the Election Between
Remedies Doctrine in Ohio
The doctrine of election between remedies works an estoppel: it bars
a plaintiff from bringing against the same defendant consecutive causes of
action for different remedies based on the identical fact situation. By this
procedural rule a plaintiff's first choice of remedy may be his last. The
courts have advanced two different lines of thinking for holding the
plaintiff to his election:
1. Estoppel by technical election, whereby the plaintiff is estopped
from making inconsistent demands for relief against the same defendant for the identical injury, or
2. Equatable estoppel, whereby the plaintiff is estopped from seeking
a different remedy from the same defendant for the identical injury because a prior lawsuit resulted in some benefit -tothe plaintiff
or detriment to the defendant.
At the common law, estoppel by technical election was strictly applied.
The mere filing of one -form of action was an election barring all other
forms of action: The plaintiff's choice is irrevocable."' In other words,
the plaintiff was not allowed to contradict the remedial form into which he
himself had cast his factual case. An 'imposed election between remedies
prohibited such technical "inconsistency."
SMAITLAND, THE FoRms OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 4 (1936 ed.)
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The codes attempted -o alleviate the harshness of the election principle.
The Ohio code, by providing for voluntary dismissal of a cause without
prejudice 2 and setting forth liberal rules for amending the petition,3 seemed
to eliminate the original petition as the crucial part of a lawsuit. Nevertheless the Ohio courts have never referred to these enactments in the
cases involving the issue of an election between remedies. Case law has
developed and continues to shape the Ohio doctrine.
Until 1924 the courts persisted in binding the plaintiff to his original
election on the ground of -technical inconsistency despite -the code. For
instance, the mere filing of a specific performance action in equity was held
to be an election to affirm the contract which precluded an "inconsistent"
action at law for breach of contract. 4 Under the code the plaintiff could
have effected this change of action by amending his original petition.5
Yet the plaintiff was deprived of his remedial right because he had dismissed his original petition wzthout prejudice, as provided by the code,
and started anew.
In 1924 the supreme court finally abolished the common law estoppel
by technical election in the leading case of Fredercksonv. Nye." The -facts
were as follows: The defendant had obtained the plaintiff's land by fraud.
Plaintiff first filed an action at law for deceit. He subsequently filed a
second suit in equity to impress a constructive trust. The court recognized
the logical anconsistency inherent -inthese two remedies:
The theory of the (first action) was that the title to the property was
in the (defendant) and a money judgment was the relief sought. It
amounted to an affirmance of the contract of conveyance of the properties
in question. On the other hand the theory of the (second action), being
the action in equity, was that of disaffirmance of the contract of conveyance
of the property and assertion that while the legal ude passed the equitable
title was in the (plaintiff) .

It was held, however, that the plaintiff was not estopped from so contradicting himself in the second action by the mere filing of his original petttion. Nor was he barred from seeking equity by having pleaded the adequacy of damages in the law action. Only equitable estoppel would restrict
plaintiff to the first remedy elected.
2

0o

SOHIO

REv. CODE 5 2323.05.
REv. CODE §§ 2309.55-.58.

'Lee v. Thoma, 1 Ohio App. 384 (1913), aff'd, 91 Ohio St. 444, 110 N. 1062
(1915); Zutterling v. Drake, 10 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 167 (1907), af'd, 82 Oio St.
410,92 N.E. 1113 (1910).
SOMo REV. CODE § 2309.55 permits practically unlimited amendment of a petition
before the defendant answers.
'Frederickson v. Nye, 110 Ohio St. 459, 144 N.E. 299 (1924).
7
Id. at 467, 144 N.E. at 301.
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The mere bringing of suit is not determinative of the right, but the
party making the election must have received some benefit under his election, or have caused detriment or loss to the other party, or pursued his
remedy to final judgment. 8

Thus the issue in election cases became, "How far must an action be carried

in order to amount to an election?"
In the Fredericksoncase the issues had been drawn in the first proceedings by the defendant's answer. This was held not to constitute an election
because mere pleading was neither a benefit to the plaintiff nor a detrnment
to the defendant. However, the plaintiff had obtained a preliminary injunction in the first action which had restrained defendant from conveying
the land. The court held that this affirmative relief was of sufficient benefit to the plaintiff and detriment to the defendant to amount to an election
based on equitable estoppel. The disposition of the case was that plaintiff
was barred by his election between remedies from bringing any action other
than his original cause in deceit for relief from the defendant's fraud.10
Election by the mere filing of suit has only rarely been the subject of
litigation since the Frederickson decision settled the issue. Moreover, the
courts have incorporated the reasoning of that case whenever the issue has

been raised. An example is Industrial Commission v. Francis" in which
the court of appeals held that the -filing, then dismissal without prejudice,
of a personal anjury action did not constitute an election -between remedies
which would bar the statutory proceeding for workmen's compensation.
The decisionis noteworthy in that it is not based on the traditional estoppel

by technical election test of inconsistent demands. Rather, the court wisely
grounded its decision on the Fredericksonrationale that the mere filing of
the prior suit was neither a benefit nor a detriment to the parties.
The doctrine of election of remedies is the application of the underlying principles of estoppel and
requires, before it can be invoked, a
showing that one of the parties has caused the other party to change his
8110 Ohio St. 459, 144 N.E. 299 (1924)
8

(syllabus by the court).

Id. at 471, 144 N.E. at 302.
" Thus the plaintiff was held to have made an election between remedies but not
because of any technical inconsistency between his original and new petitions. There
has been considerable confusion concerning this familiar holding based on a new
theory -equitable
estoppel. SHEPARD'S OHIO CITATIONS lists
Fredericksonv. Nye
as (1) "following" Buell v. Cross, 4 Ohio 327, 330 (1831), though that case had
held that "a person having an option of law or equity, after selecting one tribunal,
cannot resort to the other;" and as (2) "explaining" the Lee v. Thoma case, supra
note 4. Both cases are cited with disapproval in Frederickson v. Nye. Similarly,
DuRFEE AND DAwsoN, II RESTITUTION, Law and In Equity at 172 states that Frederickson v. Nye holds "that the mere start of a deceit action is an (election) which
precludes rescission and restitution by way of constructive trust"
' 19 Ohio L. Abs. 441 (Ohio App. 1935).
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position to his own detriment, or that the remedy chosen has been pursued
to final judgment 2
Election by the prosecution of one remedy pursued to a judgment has
been a major subject of litigation since the Fredenckson case. The rule
appears dear that a judgment granting one remedy estops a plaintiff from
seeking other relief from the same defendant for the identical injury.13 The
established exception to the rule is that a judgment against one defendant
does not bar suit against a second defendant who is severally liable.' 4 Here
the election is not final until a judgment is satisfied. For some unexplained
reason the courts have never adopted the Fredercwkson reasoning in these
cases. Obviously no detriment results to a defendant by virtue of a prior
suit against a different defendant. And the plaintiff derives no benefit
until his judgment is satisfied. The courts are content, however, merely
to hold that there has been no estoppel by technicial election because "the
remedy against one was not inconsistent with the remedy against the
other."'

8

Most of the confusion concerning the election between remedies doctrine stems from the cases in which judgment has been entered against
the plaintiff in the first suit and he then seeks another remedy in a second
action. The general rule is that, absent res judicata or an estoppel by judgment,16 a losing cause is not such an election as to bar future actions.
Two cases prior to the Frederzckson decision based this rule on lack of
"inconsistency" in seeking dissimilar remedies. The first of these cases
was Bedinger v. Stevte'7 in which the defendant defaulted on payments for
a car purchased from the plaintiff. Plaintiff lost his suit to replevy the
property because the sales contract had passed tide to the defendant. The
court of appeals held that plaintiff was not barred from his remedy of
specific performance of the contract by previously seeking this mistaken
remedy. The supreme court applied this same rule in the subsequent
case of.Conrad v. Youghiogheny and Ohso Coal Co.' in which the failure
" Id. at 443.
"Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 315, 52 N.E.2d 67, 75 (1943); REThere may be an exception when the remedy
granted cannot be satisfied.
"Land v. Berzin, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 703 (Ohio App. 1938) (judgment against a servant is not an election of remedies barring suit against the master); Heym v. Juhasz,
STATEMENT, JUDGM~mmrs § 64.

45 Ohio L. Abs. 571 (Ohio App. 1943) (judgment against wife for medical services rendered is not an election between remedies barring suit against husband for
services rendered on his behalf to wife). See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Central National Bank, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 45 (Ohio App. 1952).
"Land v. Berzin, 26 Ohio L Abs. 703 (Ohio App. 1938).
" Badgely v. Shue, 1 Ohio L Abs. 553 (Ohio App. 1923).
1 37 Ohio C.C.R. 393 (Ohio App. 1916).
U 107 Ohio St. 387, 140 N.E. 482 (1923).
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of plaintiff to obtain workmen's compensation because his injury had not
been incurred within the scope of employment did not bar his suit for personal injury. It should be noted that in both of these cases the first judgment involved findings of fact inconsistent with plaintiff's first remedy,
yet entirely consistent with the second.
In later cases courts of appeals have applied the Fredernckson reasoning
in holding that a prior adverse judgment would not estop the plaintiff from
seeking his true remedy if the judgment had been of no benefit to him or
detriment to the defendant. This new rationale was first introduced by way
of dictum in Silber v Gale.19 The plaintiff had sued on a lease for rent
due as a result of defendant's occupancy of suite 7 Defendant's answer
showed that he had actually occupied suite 8. Therefore plaintiff dismissed
this action and thereafter filed for a reformation of the lease and recovery
of the rent. The court indicated, in allowing this second suit, that even
if plaintiff's first action had gone to judgment there would have been no
detriment to the defendant which would justify an equitable estoppel.
The court of appeals decided Wessel v. Shank20 by this rule. In that
case the defendant purchased land from the plaintiff who delivered defective deeds. The defendant refused to pay the agreed purchase price.
Plaintiff thereupon sued in ejectment, treating the deeds as void. Judgment was for defendant. Plaintiff then asked for specific performance
treating the deeds as a contract to convey. In finding no election between
remedies, the court did not even discuss the technical inconsistency of
the treatment of the deeds in these two actions. Rather it held that the
first suit had not been a detriment to the defendant.
Although the courts in these two cases stated the proper test under
-theFrederckson rationale, their application seems questionable. True the
plaintiffs obtained no benefit from their first actions. But certainly the
counsel fees and inconvenience of two law suits instead of one was a detriment to the defendants. Yet the courts attached no penalty despite the
fact that this detriment was occasioned not only by the plaintiffs' mistaken
belief as to remedy, but the plaintiffs' fault as well - fault in drafting an
erroneous lease and fault in delivering a defective deed.
The cases since 1940 have unexplainedly ignored the equitable estoppel
theory of the Frederzcksoncase and reverted to the "inconsistency" reasoning. A court of appeals revaved estoppel by technical election in Taylor v.
Quinn.21 A judgment against plaintiff on one cause of action because the
statute of limitations had run was held not to bar a different cause because
"the remedy or course pursued in the former case is not inconsistent with
' 38 Ohio App. 248, 175 N.E. 886 (1930).
°57 Ohio App. 35, 11 N.E.2d 275 (1937)
*a68 Ohio App. 164, 39 N.E.2d 627 (1941)
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the remedy here sought"' 22 Thus the detriment -to the defendant of two
lawsuits caused by the plaintiff's laches was tolerated.
Another court of appeals in Roberts v. Lee23 adopted the view that there
is no election between remedies when the remedies are consistent Plaintiff's suit in quantummerumt was not estopped by his loss of an action on the
contract. His failure to join both causes, as he could have,24 and the resultant harassment of the defendant, were condoned.
In Norwood v. McDonald5 the supreme court followed the trend in
the lower courts while citing the Fredeckson decision for the proposition
that:
The doctrine of election of remedies is applicable only where, at the
time of election, there are available to the litigant for the assertion of a
single right, two or more coexisting remedies which are repugnant to and
inconsistent with each other.r

The rule is quite logical. A fancied remedy can not be inconsistent with
merited relief. When there is no election in fact there can -be no election
in law.

The plaintiff in the Norwood case had brought an action against the
deceased's estate claiming a resulting trust on certain of her property. The
equity court denied him relief on the ground of insufficent evidence. This
was held not to bar the plaintiff's ejectment action based on his claim to
be the deceased's common law husband and as such her sole heir. "Where a
judgment is for the defendant in a suit based upon one of two mutually
exclusive remedies, the plantiff is not precluded from thereafter maintaming an action for the other remedy."2 7 A dissent would have restricted
the plaintiff to his election between remedies because .the trust action had
been merely an attempt to avoid inheritance taxes.
The Norwood decision seems inconsistent with the prior supreme court
case of Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.28 There a judgment against the plaintiff's
claim that certain property in her husband's estate had been a gift was held
to be res judicata as to her suit for an express trust2 9 The court held that
she had but one cause of action for the property against her husband's estate.
ZId. at 169, 39 N.E.2d at 629.
n72 Ohio App. 235, 51 N.E.2d 108 (1942).

Smith v. Horvath, 32 Ohio L Abs. 170 (Ohio App. 1939).
" 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1943).
MId. at 315, 52 N.E.2d at 75.
=7 Ib
h.
136 Ohio St. 517, 27 N.E.2d 145 (1940)
" Fortunately for the plaintiff this election between remedies was held not to bar her
statutory action, upon waiving the will for a 1/3 enforced interest in the whole
estate. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944),
This holding ss consistent with Norwood v. McDonald.
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And yet in the Norwood case the plaintiff was said to have two causes of
action against his wife's estate by vrue of the consistency of the remedies
sought
The inconsistency in these two cases is inevitable under the reasoning
used. Whether one remedy is consistent or inconsistent with another,
whether the plaintiff has one or two causes of action -these are but conclusions too nebulous and technical in themselves to serve as the foundation
for -theultimate conclusion of rights and liabilities.
The benefit-detriment test laid down in the Fredericksoncase is simpler
of application and sounder in theory. The courts should recognize equitable estoppel as the only rationale for the election doctrine.
Furthermore, the courts should recognize that two lawsuits are a detriment to the defendant - particularly where the plaintiff's own fault or
failure to join his causes of action put the defendant to his defense twice
instead of once.
Finally, and most important, the drastic effect of the election doctrine
should be alleviated. Modern courts should not persist in mimicking their
common law counterparts: "With me, ies all or nothing." The plaintiff
should not be irrevocably estopped by an election between remedies merely
because he realized some benefit (which did not satisfy his claim) or
because he caused some detriment (which did not fulfill the defendanes
obligation) Justice might better be done if a plaintiff were only estopped
from his second remedy until he returned any benefit he had obtained in
his -first action and until he reimbursed the defendant for any detriment he
had proximately caused.5 0 Thus, in the Norwood case the court should not
have been so reluctant to find an election between remedies. The equitable
estoppel should have only imposed a condition precedent to the second
rlton: reimbursement of the defendant for his expenses in the first lawsuit. The fairness of this proposition seems irrefutable. The plaintiff
T-'ther than the defendant would have taken the risk of the plaintiff's gamble
n avoid taxes. Similarly, in the Fredericksonsituation the negligible benefit to the plaintiff and measureable detriment to the defendant of the preliminary injunction should not have had the decisive effect of fixing (or
possibly terminating) the rights and liabilities of the parties. Mere damDictum in State v. Broskey, 128 Ohio St. 372, 191 N.E. 456 (1934), would seem
to go farther than this suggestion. There plaintiff brought a personal injury action
which the defendant settled for $6,500. Plaintiff then sought workmen's compensation from the defendant claiming that the first action had been brought under the
mistaken belief that -plaintiff was not entitled to workmen's compensation. In denying this second remedy the supreme court indicated that had plaintiff returned the
$6,500 benefit he had obtained in the -first suit, his second action would not be
barred.
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